finding." While it may be relevant to the chosen 2 sanction, it's not relevant to the validity of the 3 4 contempt finding. The Court finds that Ms. Davis is therefore in contempt of this Court's order. 5 6 Now, the Court doesn't do that lightly, I don't -- you don't strike me as being 7 someone who's contentious or combative. I simply 8 believe that in making this contempt finding, it's 9 necessary, for a number of reasons that I'll get into. 10 The Court does reject your argument that you 11 are presently unable to comply. The case law discusses the concept of being factually unable to 13 comply where you may not have any control over certain 14 things. There was an example of money in a bank 15 account. That's -- one of the cases discusses that. 16 There's simply no authority that the Court 17 can find for the proposition that "presently unable to 18 comply" includes a situation where someone chooses not to comply because they have religious objections from 20 21 doing so. This case is not a situation where there is a 22 factual impossibility of complying. In fact, 23 Ms. Davis testified herself that she's not 2.4 25 physically -- it's not physically impossible for her

to issue the licenses. She's choosing not to do so because of her religious beliefs.

1.3

Her good faith belief is simply not a viable defense in this civil context proceeding. And the Court cites the *Glover V. Johnson* case, 934 F.2d 703, at page 708, Sixth Circuit, 1991.

The Court must be mindful, especially in cases which have garnered the public's interests, as this one has, in avoiding situations which would cause a proverbial slippery slope.

And in making the Court's determination that she's in contempt, I have to be mindful of the fact that whatever the Court does here, it may have a ripple effect on other types of situations.

What's to prevent the next person or party from refusing to comply with a lawfully issued order because they personally disagree with it for a variety of reasons, in this case, the reason being her genuinely-held religious beliefs.

I, myself, have generally-held religious beliefs. I'm sure many of the folks in this courtroom have their own genuinely-held religious beliefs.

I took an oath 13-plus years ago. Ms. Davis took an oath in January. Many of the marshals in this room took an oath. Many of the law enforcement

officers took an oath. Oaths mean things.

1.3

I used the example earlier about a Catholic clerk, and I only used that because I'm Catholic, and I generally have an idea of what is in the Catechism, the Second Vatican Council, I have a general idea. I went to Catholic high school. I have some vague familiarity from my prior life of what Catholics believe in.

The marriage license forum itself asks questions such as prior marriages. And if a Catholic clerk wouldn't -- didn't want to issue a marriage license to someone who was eligible to marry because they hadn't had their marriage annulled, would that clerk be able to do so? That's just one example.

I mean, if I were to agree that someone could have a religious objection to doing this, what's to prevent him or her from doing it in that case? And you can extend this out to other types of situations where it could cause a ripple effect.

In this country, we live in a society of laws. Our system of justice requires citizens, and significantly our elected officials, to follow orders of the Court. Indeed, the fabric of our judicial branch relies upon that principle practically every day.

There's a number of other particular arguments in the response that the Court is going to address.

2.4

Ms. Davis raises the issue of due process, that her due process rights have been violated during these contempt proceedings. She has had notice and an opportunity to be heard. Her constitutional rights have been addressed in the Court's prior decision. There's simply no viable due process argument in the Court's view regarding these civil contempt proceedings.

She also argues that criminal contempt proceedings require greater protections. The Court agrees. If this was a criminal contempt proceeding, there would be greater protections. However, this is a civil contempt proceeding, which is designed to coerce or gain compliance with the Court's order. So these added protections that are mentioned in the case law for criminal contempt simply don't apply.

She also argues, and Mr. Christman has argued this this afternoon, that any contempt order will substantially burden her religious rights under RFRA. The Court did address her RFRA argument in the prior memorandum, opinion and order. And I may issue a brief order on that particular issue post-hearing.

But for today's purposes, the Court -- those of you who have read the Court's order know what the Court's prior decision was.

1.3

The Court found no substantial burden because she is merely certifying that the couple is legally qualified to marry. And frankly, that -- I think when it comes to that particular issue, given the fact that the Circuit language in its order denying the motion to stay was so specific as it relates to her substant -- her ability to prove that she has a likelihood of success on the merits. That order, while it's only an order denying the motion to stay, it is telling us to what the Circuit -- or how the Circuit may view the merit's appeal.

Also, the defendant argues that by entering a contempt order, it would be premature and improperly intrusive in the state of affairs. The Court disagrees. It's not premature in the Court's view. This Court and both appellate courts, as everyone knows, both the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, have upheld the denial of the motion to stay, pending appeal.

The Court does have the authority under rule -- not Rule 4, but Section 401 of Title 18 to enforce its lawfully issued orders through this civil

contempt proceeding.

2.4

The defendant argues that it's not a situation to where contempt is warranted because less intrusive alternatives are available.

I recognize, and I mentioned this when we first came out earlier this morning, that the legislative and executive branches do have the ability to make changes. And those changes may be beneficial to everyone. Hopefully, changes are made. But it's not this Court's job to make those changes. I don't write law.

Now, sometimes district courts are called to rule on things that there aren't any cases or other authority for. They talk about writing on a clean slate. It's a rare opportunity for a court to write on a clean slate. In those situations, the Court occasionally is called upon to interpret what the law is, and that's kind of what this Court is doing here, to a certain extent.

These legislative and executive options which have been identified in the response have not yet come to pass, or were previously addressed in the prior memorandum, opinion, and order. This idea that she's absent because she's chosen not to issue these licenses, I previously addressed that. I'm not going

to plow that same ground here this afternoon. Civil contempt is the Court's way of 2 compelling or coercing compliance with its orders. 3 legislative or executive remedies do not -- or do come to fruition, as I stated, better for everyone. However, the Court cannot condone the willful disobedience of its lawfully issued order. To do otherwise, would allow individuals to violate the 8 orders of the Court without any consequences. And the 9 Court simply cannot allow that to occur. I simply think that if you give people the 11 opportunity to choose which orders that they follow, that's what potentially causes problems. Society 1.3 depends on individuals and entities and parties to 14 follow lawfully issued orders. 15 This idea of natural law superseding this 16 Court's authority. I have no doubt that you believe 17 18 that, ma'am; I do. I mean, that's your right to believe that. But to allow that to carry the day, if 19 you will, in ruling on this motion simply would be a 20 dangerous precedent, indeed. 22 Regarding the sanction, the case law suggests 23 that we have the least possible sanction considered to 24 coerce compliance with the order. 25 In this case, the Court finds that the

requested financial penalties would simply be insufficient to compel her immediate compliance with the order.

1.3

The probable effectiveness of any financial sanction will not bring about the desired result of compliance. I don't say these things lightly; I don't. I have given this case a lot of thought.

Each of the judges that have sworn an oath to uphold the Constitution and follow the law and not create law, have a handful of cases where what is required that they do may be different than what I think perhaps the Court should do.

But 13 years ago, I told senators in

Washington that I would do what was required to be

done. So -- and I brought that up initially because I

think it's important for everybody to recognize

that -- I mean, I don't hold -- I think I've had two

or three times in 13 years where I've actually been

asked to hold a party or a person in contempt. And

the Court doesn't do this lightly. It's necessary in

this case, because to do otherwise, would allow

someone to -- who took an oath to follow the law, to

kind of pick and choose what orders they want to

follow. And that's simply not the way that the court

system is set up, nor is it the way that the court

system can operate in a civilized society.

1.3

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And frankly, the judicial branch wouldn't function properly if we allowed individuals to simply decide not to follow orders of the court.

In not ordering that a fine be issued, and I know you've requested a fine here. The fact that there's these other funds set up, and I realize the testimony was somewhat vague about that, I'm not convinced that other individuals would pay the penalties if I imposed a fine.

So in this particular instance, ma'am, I'm going to order that you be remanded to the custody of the marshal. To gain compliance with the order, I believe it's necessary in this case. So I'm going to order that you be remanded to the custody of the marshal for your refusal to comply with the Court's order.

You can purge yourself of that contempt order by indicating compliance. I'm not going to put a deadline on it. If you want to order your clerks to allow the licenses to be issued, you can purge yourself of contempt.

So that will be the order of the Court. So you'll be remanded to the custody of the marshal, pending your compliance with the Court's order.

Now -- you can go ahead and escort her out. 1 2 Thank you. THE DEFENDANT: Thank you, Judge. 3 4 THE COURT: Thank you, ma'am. All right. Before moving on to the deputy 5 clerks, I want to mention that the Court's order dated 6 August 12th, enjoined the defendant, Ms. Davis, in her 7 official capacity from enforcing her policy, which I 8 amended this morning over the plaintiffs' objection. 9 That is a continuing order, unless and until it's set aside by this Court, having a different order or any 11 other reviewing court. So if there's a -- if I'm notified that 1.3 Ms. Davis has purged herself of the contempt, I can do 14 The fact that this contempt hearing was even 15 that. necessary demonstrates the need for that. 16 All right. As you know from the telephone 17 conference two days ago, I did order the deputy clerks 18 to be present for the hearing today. 19 Rule 65(d)(2)(B) and (C) set forth who was 20 bound by the injunction. And I brought out my statute book -- or my rule book, excuse me. 22 23 Two, persons -- the order binds only the 2.4 following who received actual notice of it by personal 25 service or otherwise.

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            The parties' -- B., the parties' official's
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  agents, servants, employees.
            And C., other persons who are in active
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4
   concert or participation with anyone described in the
  rule.
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6
            So she did testify, Ms. Davis, that she
  instructed the deputy clerks not to issue licenses.
7
  So would you concur or disagree with the proposition
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  that under Rule 65(d)(2)(B) and (C), that the deputy
9
   clerks are agents or servants or employees of the
  parties in this case?
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            MR. GANNAM: Your Honor, the deputy clerks --
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            THE COURT: You don't represent them?
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            MR. GANNAM: We do not, Your Honor.
14
15
            THE COURT: Okay.
            MR. GANNAM: And I would simply assert that
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   they have a right to be heard in this case.
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            THE COURT:
                        Thev do.
                                  They do. And we're
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   going to take up that in a second. But do you wish --
   you both stood up immediately, and I want to give you
20
   an opportunity to be heard.
            MR. CHRISTMAN: Your Honor, before we move on
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23
  to the deputies and whatever the Court has in mind,
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  we'd ask that your finding of contempt, that you would
25
  certify that finding and ruling for immediate appeal
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to the Sixth Circuit under 1291. THE COURT: Well, I'll take that up in a 2 I'm not going to do that right now because I 3 4 have some other matters I need to take up first. MR. CHRISTMAN: And in addition to that, we 5 would ask that you would -- upon certifying it, if you 6 7 grant that motion, then you would also stay any enforcement for sanction from the contempt to allow 8 Ms. Davis to seek emergency relief from the Sixth 9 Circuit from this very weighty ruling from the Court that is different and substantial in terms of 11 affecting her individual rights. THE COURT: Well, I recognize it's an 1.3 important ruling. I do. I do. I certainly haven't 14 made the decision lightly, Mr. Christman. 15 MR. CHRISTMAN: And given that, Your Honor, 16 we would ask that you would allow immediate appeal of 17 that ruling and a stay of any enforcement of any 18 sanction from which the Court has just ordered. 19 THE COURT: So your oral motion is to certify 20 the issue for immediate appeal. Because a contempt order is ordinarily not something like the preliminary 22 23 injunction was entered, you had an appeal of right. 2.4 You don't have an appeal of right on a contempt order. 25 And you recognize that it needs -- it needs to be

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certified.
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                            There are exceptions to the
            MR. CHRISTMAN:
  1291 ruling, the Collateral Order Doctrine in
3
  particular that can be raised. But to expedite the
   appeal process, given the weightiness and significance
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   of this Court's ruling today, we would ask for that
6
   emergent -- that certification to short-circuit our
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   ability to file that appeal in the Sixth Circuit,
8
  because the Court's order today is tied to the
9
  merits of --
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            THE COURT: Well, I agree with that.
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12
            MR. CHRISTMAN: -- the preliminary injunction
  that had been taken up.
13
                        So I'm just trying to make sure
            THE COURT:
14
   since we'll have the minutes of this proceeding -- and
15
   frankly, just before I forget. Madam Clerk, when
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17
   you're doing the minutes --
18
            DEPUTY CLERK: Yes, sir.
            THE COURT: -- the plaintiffs' motion, it's
19
   67, to hold Ms. Davis in contempt was granted for the
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21
   reasons set forth on the record. I'm likely going to
   supplement with that with perhaps a brief follow-up
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23
   memorandum order on part of the reasoning that I
24
  wanted to kind of -- I may want to supplement that,
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   and I'll do that relatively quickly.
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The minutes will also reflect that you're
orally moving for the Court to certify the issue
regarding the granting of the motion for contempt, and
also orally moving to have that order stayed pending
appeal.
         MR. CHRISTMAN: That's correct, Your Honor.
                     Okay. All right. We'll make
         THE COURT:
sure the record reflects that.
         Do you want to file a written response to
that?
         MR. SHARP:
                     I mean, we object, Your Honor.
I mean, we --
         THE COURT:
                     I know you object. I understand
       I'll just -- I'll just submit that.
         I know I could probably have a 30-page motion
with a memoranda filed by this afternoon by, I quess,
other Liberty Counsel who aren't in court, but I --
         MR. CHRISTMAN: Your Honor, with all due
respect, we could not get more emergent than the
circumstances that have happened, so we --
         THE COURT:
                     Well, I understand that.
         MR. CHRISTMAN: -- would ask for a ruling on
that motion.
         THE COURT: Okay. That motion will be
denied.
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MR. SHARP: Your Honor, thank you. 1 That motion will be denied. 2 THE COURT: Now, the motion to stay will be denied, and 3 4 the motion to -- to --- the certification motion will be denied as well. 5 6 MR. CHRISTMAN: In -- in light of that, Your Honor, then alternatively, we would move that you 7 would suspend any sentence until the legislature meets 8 and has an opportunity to revise the Kentucky marriage 9 licensing scheme and permit Kim Davis to be taken out of the custody until the legislature has a chance to 11 address the entire Kentucky marriage licensing scheme. That motion will be denied as 1.3 THE COURT: well. 14 15 This case, at its core, is about individuals following the Court's order, and that's -- the Court 16 previously found that she had not, and the Court 17 certainly didn't make its decision lightly. 18 Okay. Given that Ms. Davis and her deputies 19 did discuss, and she, in fact, did indicate that she 20 21 had instructed her deputies not to issue the marriage licenses, the Court has chosen to ask several 22 23 court-appointed counsel who are members of the Federal 2.4 Public Defender list here in Ashland to advise the 25 deputies.

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And I don't know who the deputies are. Up to
this point, they've just been deputies of Kim Davis.
So what I'm going to need to do is I have -- and what
we did, I just had the clerk call the six panel
attorneys who would otherwise be appointed to
represent individuals who may have -- may be subject
to being in contempt themselves.
         So if you're one of the deputy clerks --
there were eight identified, but I only called six
attorneys because -- the individuals who are
front-line deputies, I don't know who you are, if you
would all would stand. I mean, if you're one of the
five.
         Okay.
               All right.
                            There were six. But if
you would just first of all identify yourself, sir.
         MR. DAVIS: Nathaniel Ray Davis.
         THE COURT: Nathaniel Davis?
         MR. DAVIS:
                     Yes.
                     Okay. All right. And you,
         THE COURT:
ma'am?
         MS. PLANK:
                     Kristie Plank.
         THE COURT:
                     What's your last name?
         MS. PLANK:
                     Plank, P-L-A-N-K.
         THE COURT:
                     Plank, P-L-A-N-K?
         MS. PLANK:
                     Uh-huh (affirmatively).
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THE COURT: All right. Sir?
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            MR. MASON: Brian Mason.
            THE COURT: B-R-Y-A-N?
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 4
            MR. MASON: B-R-I-A-N.
            THE COURT:
                        Okay. Mason --
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 6
            MR. MASON:
                        Yes, M-A-S-O-N.
7
            THE COURT: -- like the county?
            MR. MASON: M-A-S-O-N.
8
9
            THE COURT: Okay. You, ma'am?
            MS. RUSSELL: Kim Russell.
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            THE COURT: Kim Russell, common spelling last
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   name, like the county here?
            MS. RUSSELL: R-U-S-S-E-L-L.
1.3
            THE COURT: All right. Kim, K-I-M?
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            MS. RUSSELL: Yes.
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            THE COURT: All right. And what's your name,
16
  ma'am?
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            MS. THOMPSON:
                          Melissa Thompson.
19
            THE COURT: Melissa Thompson?
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            MS. THOMPSON: Uh-huh (affirmatively).
21
            THE COURT: Okay. Now, what I'm going to do,
  in the order in which Kelly, the clerk, yesterday gave
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  me the list in order. I'm assuming the list she gave
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  me was just the order in which they'd be -- they would
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  have been called?
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            DEPUTY CLERK:
                           Yes.
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            THE COURT: All right. Mr. Davis, I'm going
  to have you meet with Mike Campbell. He's a member of
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4
  the federal public defender list here in Ashland.
            Ms. Plank, I'm going to have you meet with
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  Michael Fox.
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            Brian Mason, the Court is going to -- and I'm
  going to appoint each of you to represent each of
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   the -- because you are -- each of you are non-parties
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   to this litigation. But because of the way the rule
   reads, you could potentially be held in contempt
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   yourselves because you're acting as her agent. That's
   why the Court felt it was important to have you talk
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   to counsel. Liberty Counsel represent Ms. Davis, not
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   each of you.
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            So, Mr. Mason, you'll be meeting with
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   Mr. Hughes. Ms. Russell, you'll be meeting with
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   Mr. Joy. And, Ms. Thompson, you'll be meeting with
18
   Mr. Markelonis.
19
            Mr. Clark, I thought there were six clerks.
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            MR. CLARK:
                        That's fine, Your Honor.
            THE COURT:
                        I apologize for having you here.
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23
  All right.
2.4
            MS. EARLEY: Judge, as Barry said, I'm a
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  non-issuing marriage license -- I'm not -- the
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department I work in does not issue marriage licenses, but I am one of the deputies. But are you eligible to issue the THE COURT: licenses, though? MS. EARLEY: As a deputy, I would assume. Ι do not do it now. It's not part of my department. THE COURT: Okay. Well, I -- just out of an abundance of caution then, ma'am, I'm going to have Jeremy Clark, a member of the public defender list, appointed to represent you. MS. EARLEY: Okay. THE COURT: What we're going to do -- I know we have a large contingency of folks here today. And this courtroom and courthouse is somewhat small. So rather than clear the courtroom, I'm going to give each of you 30 minutes. We'll come back at 1:45. Each of you can meet with each of your respective lawyers. And what I'm going to in essence be asking, the Court could find that one or more of you would be in contempt of the order as a non-party pursuant to the rule I previously stated, and the sanction for such finding could include fines and/or imprisonment. The Court has asked each of these public defenders to advise you of your rights. So after having the opportunity to meet with

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counsel, I'm going to be asking each of you, after a
brief recess, whether or not you intend on complying
with the Court's order requiring you to issue marriage
licenses from the plaintiffs in this case, or any
other individuals who are legally eligible to marry.
         So, Mr. Marshal, if you could -- I know
there's several jury rooms. There's the grand jury
suite in the back. There's a jury room back here in
chambers.
         I'm, of course, not going to be party to any
of this. I'm just trying to get -- if you could find
six different places for them to meet --
         DEPUTY MARSHAL: Yes, Your Honor.
         THE COURT: -- with their respective
attorneys. And we'll make sure that each of you are
appointed to represent each of these particular
deputies.
         So we'll allow that to occur. We'll come
back in at 1:45.
         MR. CHRISTMAN: Your Honor, if I could -- if
I could make an objection.
         THE COURT: What -- what's your objection to?
         MR. CHRISTMAN: That all of these deputies
can only issue marriage licenses based upon the
authority of Kim Davis, and Kim Davis has not given
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them that authority.
            So the one deputy clerk has -- who has said
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  she cannot issue licenses, it's not in her department,
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4
  that applies to all of the deputy clerks because none
  of the deputy clerks can issue a marriage license
5
  bearing Kim Davis's name and on her authorization
  because she has not given that authorization.
7
            THE COURT: Well, your objection's noted and
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              I'm going to have them talk to these
9
   overruled.
10
   lawyers.
                            Thank you, Your Honor.
            MR. CHRISTMAN:
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            THE COURT: We'll be in recess until 1:45.
            [RECESS - 1:13 - 1:51 p.m.]
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            [IN OPEN COURT]
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            THE COURT: All right. Before we took our
   recess, I had appointed CJA panel attorneys to the six
   deputies.
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            And I apologize, what was your name, ma'am?
            MS. EARLEY:
                         Mine?
19
            THE COURT: Yes.
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            MS. EARLEY: Roberta Earley.
            THE COURT:
                        Earley?
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23
            MS. EARLEY: Earley, E-A-R-L-E-Y
2.4
            THE COURT:
                        Is that E -- E-A-R-L?
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            MS. EARLEY: E-A-R-L-E-Y.
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THE COURT: Okay. All right. And I had appointed counsel for the six deputies so that they could advise them of their rights. And before we broke, and I apologize, I had been citing to Rule 62. It's actually Rule 65(d)(2). That was my error. I mentioned earlier, I'm -- my eyes aren't as good as they used to be, so I was just -- I had the wrong rule regarding whether or not agents or employees are bound by a prior injunction order, and that rule will stand for that proposition. And there was an issue that you had raised, Mr. Christman, about they only act at her behest, and, therefore, they can't do something without her authority. I have found earlier that she is in contempt of the Court's order. And, of course, you disagree with that, and I recognize that, because she's not complying with the order. If she instructs the deputies to not comply with the order, how is that different than from, like,

for instance, a biracial couple comes in, and she

says, "Don't issue the license."? Or a completely

African-American couple comes in and she says, "Don't

issue the license."? If it's an unlawful order, do

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they have to -- do they have to -- do they have to
  follow it?
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            MR. CHRISTMAN: Which lawful order -- the
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  lawful order --
            THE COURT: Well, either one. I mean, giving
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  those examples, let's say, for instance, Ms. Davis
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  gave an order to her clerks -- and I'm not saying that
  she would ever do this -- but hypothetically, a
  biracial couple comes in, "Don't issue the order." Of
  course, Loving V. Virginia, and we're not going to get
   into the details, but, I mean, that's -- obviously,
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   that would be an unlawful order. Would they have to
   follow it, even if they -- gosh, I don't think that's
1.3
   right, but if that's an unlawful order, do the
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   deputies have to follow it?
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            MR. CHRISTMAN: Well, their authorization
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   under Kentucky statute comes from --
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            THE COURT: What statute?
            MR. CHRISTMAN: -- the county clerk.
19
   chapter for marriage laws is 402, and --
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21
            THE COURT: What chapter governs what the
   deputy clerks have to do?
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23
            MR. CHRISTMAN: Well, the statute that was in
24
  place before Obergefell, 402.100, and --
25
            THE COURT:
                        What does that say the deputy
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clerks have to do?
            MR. CHRISTMAN: Well, that -- that statute is
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  the one that says the authorization statement is from
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  the county clerk, which hasn't been given, and also --
            THE COURT: Well, I'm holding that she's in
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  violation of the Court's order by not authorizing it.
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            MR. CHRISTMAN:
                            That -- that is what you held
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            THE COURT:
                        Correct.
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            MR. CHRISTMAN: -- but their authority comes
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   from her, not from you.
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12
            THE COURT: Well, if they follow her
   authority and her authority's in contempt, why can't
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   they be held in contempt as agents or employees of
14
15
  hers?
                            Because the only authority
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            MR. CHRISTMAN:
   they can give is from her. This Court doesn't have
17
   authority to rewrite Kentucky marriage statutes.
18
                        Okay. So I can't -- so taking
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            THE COURT:
   that to its logical conclusion, though, if someone --
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   an employer tells an employee to do something, and
   they -- just general agency principals, if they're an
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23
   agent, why, under Rule 65(d)(2)(B), shouldn't they be
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  bound by the Court's preliminary injunction?
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            MR. CHRISTMAN:
                            Well, because here, the
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employer has told the employee, "You don't have my
authority to issue it." You're --
         THE COURT: Are they able to do it without
that?
       Let's say one of them --
         MR. CHRISTMAN: The analogy you're creating
is you're inserting yourself as the employer and the
authorizing agent and issuer of the marriage license.
         THE COURT:
                    Okay. If I told them they can't
do it, but a court says they have to, they still --
you're saying they can't do it because she said they
couldn't?
         MR. CHRISTMAN: Because their authority --
because at that point then, you're raising
implications and issues with respect to what the
Kentucky marriage law and the marriage licensing
scheme, which again, has been completely overwritten,
but those aspects that are being -- are trying to be
applied, that authority comes exclusively from the
county clerk. That's the -- that's the core issue
here.
         THE COURT:
                    All right. Mr. Sharp, what's
your response to this? They're arguing, in essence --
and correct me if I'm wrong, because I want to make
sure that we get it right -- because the clerk is not
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authorizing them to issue the licenses, and she

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testified this morning that she's very plainly,
candidly, and I certainly appreciate that, that she
told them that, "We are not issuing licenses pending
appeal," I think is what she said.
         MR. SHARP: We think the Court's absolutely
correct as far as there is a valid court order
preliminarily enjoining Ms. Davis in her official
capacity from enforcing the "no marriage license"
policy.
         To the extent her employees continue to
adhere to enforcement of what this Court has enjoined,
then we think 65(d)(2)(B) would in fact be implicated,
and, you know, their ability to be held in contempt,
even as a non-party, would be at play.
         THE COURT:
                     Okay. Let me ask you,
Ms. Parsons, Mr. Watkins. What the Court does -- I
recognize that what the Court does here potentially
impacts the services, et cetera, provided by the
clerk's office of Rowan County. Do you all take a
position on the applicability of Rule 65(d)(2)(B) as
it relates to the deputies?
         MR. WATKINS: Judge, I -- I think they can
issue them in her absence at that point because
they're -- they're acting in concert as -- as the
clerk.
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            If -- if what they say is true, she's allowed
2
  to pick the religious beliefs of her deputy clerks,
   and everybody knows that's -- that's illegal.
3
            THE COURT: Ms. Parsons? So -- so it's the
  position of the county attorney, sir, that they can
   issue the licenses in her absence?
            MR. WATKINS: Absolutely.
            THE COURT: All right. Ms. Parsons?
            MS. PARSONS: I have the same position.
            THE COURT: All right. All right. Let me
  now turn to the actual individuals in play here and --
11
   I can't remember who was appointed to represent who,
1.3
   so maybe you all can help me.
            I'll start with you, Mr. Campbell.
14
            MR. CAMPBELL: I was appointed to represent
  Mr. Davis.
16
17
            THE COURT:
                       All right, sir. Did you have an
   opportunity to talk to him in the interim?
18
                           I did, Your Honor.
19
            MR. CAMPBELL:
            THE COURT: All right. Did you explain to
20
  him the potential consequences of compliance with the
   Court's order?
22
23
            MR. CAMPBELL: I did.
2.4
            THE COURT: All right. Mr. Davis, did you
25 meet with Mr. Campbell, sir?
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MR. DAVIS: I did, sir.
1
            THE COURT: Okay. And I take it -- and I
2
  don't think the record really reflects this, so I'll
3
4
   just ask. I mean, Kim Davis is your mother; is that
5
   right?
 6
            MR. DAVIS:
                        She is my mother, sir, yes.
7
            THE COURT:
                        Okay. All right. Again, we go
  back to what's of the public domain and what's
8
   actually of record domain, and I wanted to make sure
9
   that reflects that. Mr. Campbell?
            MR. CAMPBELL: Yes, that's his mother, Your
11
12
  Honor.
            THE COURT: All right. Okay. I'm going to
1.3
  ask you all collectively something. Thank you.
14
15
            Mr. Fox, who were you appointed for?
            MR. FOX: Yes, Your Honor. I represent
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   Ms. Plank.
17
18
            THE COURT: Ms. Plank?
19
            MS. PLANK: Yes.
20
            THE COURT: All right. Mr. Fox, did you have
   an opportunity to talk to Ms. Plank about the
   potential consequences of compliance with the Court's
   order?
23
24
            MR. FOX:
                      I did, Your Honor.
25
                        All right. Ms. Plank, did you
            THE COURT:
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talk to Mr. Fox about that?
2
            MS. PLANK:
                        I did.
                        Okay. All right. Mr. Joy?
            THE COURT:
3
4
            MR. JOY: Yes, sir.
            THE COURT: Let me make a note here.
5
   Campbell, Fox.
6
7
            MR. JOY:
                     I have Ms. Russell, Judge.
            THE COURT:
                        Ms. Russell? All right.
8
            In the interim during the recess, Mr. Joy,
9
   did you have an opportunity to talk to Ms. Russell?
            MR. JOY: I did, Your Honor.
11
12
            THE COURT: And did you explain to her the
13
  potential consequences of a contempt finding?
            MR. JOY: I did, Your Honor.
14
15
            THE COURT: All right. Ms. Russell, is that
   accurate; did you speak with Mr. Joy?
                        I did.
17
            MS. PLANK:
            THE COURT:
                        Okay. All right. Thank you.
18
  Mr. Hughes, you have Mr. Mason?
            MR. HUGHES: Yes, sir, I do.
20
            THE COURT:
21
                        All right. Mr. Hughes, did you
  have an opportunity to discuss with Mr. Mason the
22
23
   contempt proceedings and the possibilities and the
2.4
  possible consequences for not complying with the
25
  Court's order?
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MR. HUGHES: Yes, I did.
1
2
            THE COURT: All right. Mr. Mason, did you
  have a chance to talk to him about that?
3
4
            MR. MASON:
                        Yes, Judge.
            THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. And Mr. --
5
  who's left? Mr. Markelonis, you have Ms. Thompson?
6
7
            MR. MARKELONIS: Yes, sir, I did.
            THE COURT: And, Mr. Markelonis, the same
8
   questions. Did you have a chance to talk to her about
9
   the contempt proceedings and the potential
   consequences of non-compliance with the Court's order?
11
12
            MR. MARKELONIS: I did, Judge.
            THE COURT: All right. Ms. Thompson, did you
1.3
  speak with Mr. Markelonis about that?
14
15
            MS. THOMPSON:
                           I did, Judge.
            THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. And,
16
  Ms. Earley, you met with Mr. Clark; is that right?
17
18
            MS. THOMPSON:
                           I did.
            THE COURT: Mr. Clark, did you explain to her
19
20
   the potential consequences of non-compliance with the
   Court's order?
2.1
            MR. CLARK:
                        I did, Your Honor.
22
23
            THE COURT:
                        Okay. Ms. Earley, did you speak
2.4
  to him about that?
            MS. EARLEY: I did.
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THE COURT: Okay. All right. Now, up to this point, the record does not reflect which deputy the individual plaintiffs may have spoken with on prior occasions. I know since the order denying the motion to stay was entered by the Supreme Court, which was Monday of this week, which was I think approximately 7:00 on Monday night, the 31st, I don't know who Ms. Miller met with; she may remember which one. But the important thing for the Court at this point is to see if any of the deputies would be intending on complying with the Court's order, the preliminary injunction order which has enjoined Ms. Davis from enforcing her "no marriage license" policy to the plaintiffs in this case or to any other individuals who were legally eligible to marry. I guess we'll just start with each of you in the order in which I addressed you earlier. Judge, if I may --MR. HUGHES: THE COURT: Yes. MR. HUGHES: -- save that trouble. Mr. Mason was the one that had discussed that with Ms. Davis, and he'd already indicated to her that he would issue those licenses, if he were allowed to do so. He has indicated to me that he will comply

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with this Court's order to do that. But there are
some practical problems. One, he doesn't even have a
key to get in the offices. That can probably be
overcome.
         The second is the concern that was raised by
honorable counsel here involving the state statutes
and what authority they have if in fact Ms. Davis is
still saying that she does not give them the
authority.
         So he -- that may be an issue that has to be
addressed somewhere outside this Court. Perhaps this
Court can answer his question, but he wants you to
know that he intends to comply with this Court's
ruling and issue the licenses.
         THE COURT: Mr. Davis -- or, Mr. Mason? I'm
sorry. Yes, if you'd come around, please, with
Mr. Hughes.
         I'm going to go ahead and place you under
oath.
         Madam Clerk, if you would place Mr. Davis
under oath, please. Sorry, Mr. Mason. I'm sorry.
                                                    I
have Mr. Davis first on the list. Mr. Mason, I
apologize, sir.
             [BRIAN MASON, having been first placed
    under oath, was examined and responded as
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follows: ]
1
            THE COURT: All right. Mr. Mason, do you
2
  intend on complying with this Court's order which
3
  previously enjoined Ms. Davis from enforcing her "no
  marriage license" policy?
5
            MR. MASON: I advised her that -- and she
6
  knew that I was willing to issue those from the
7
  beginning, but I did not want to go against her
8
  wishes. But, you know, I can't go to jail or be fined
9
   either.
10
                        How long -- how long have you
11
            THE COURT:
  been a deputy?
            MR. MASON:
                        I started working there in
1.3
   January of 2014.
14
15
            THE COURT:
                        Okay. So you started a year
  before she became --
16
            MR. MASON:
17
                        Yes.
            THE COURT: You worked for her mother?
18
            MR. MASON: Yes. Ms. Bailey.
19
                        Okay. All right. So you are not
20
            THE COURT:
   going to follow her -- well, put it this way. You've
   told me that you are willing to comply with the
22
23
   Court's order requiring you to issue marriage licenses
2.4
  to the plaintiffs in this case or any other
25
   individuals who are legally eligible to marry; is that
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right?
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2
            MR. MASON: Yes.
            THE COURT: All right. Now, by doing so, and
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4
  I bring this up because I mentioned earlier, that this
  Court has an ongoing -- thank you, sir. You -- you
  may step back -- this Court has an ongoing interest in
  ensuring that its orders are complied with. And what
   I want to avoid is a situation where someone issues a
8
   license, something occurs with that individual, we're
9
   right back here next week, and we have a proverbial
  ping-pong match going forward.
11
12
            And I have always been, since the very
  beginning of this filing when the case was reassigned
13
   to me, interested in trying to see if we could get
14
   some sort of resolution, and there has been -- at
15
   every turn, the parties have been at odds.
            And I say the "parties." You all are not
17
  parties. The six of you all are non-parties. You are
18
   not sued in this action. But each of you are
   employees or agents of Ms. Davis, and I previously
20
   found her to be in contempt. Now, I gave my reasons
   for that. I probably am going to follow up with a
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23
  brief written order to supplement part of the prior
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   oral findings.
25
            But if -- if Mr. -- I simply don't think in
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the Court's view that telling someone to not comply
with a lawful order is something that a clerk, or
anyone else who takes an oath to uphold the law, is
able to do.
         MR. JOY: Your Honor, may I?
         THE COURT: Yes, sir. Mr. Joy?
         MR. JOY:
                  Your Honor, I think you addressed
an issue earlier, but I think you kind of glanced over
       I think I feel the need to -- to bring that
that.
back up. You addressed agency principal earlier.
         THE COURT:
                     Right.
         MR. JOY: Under an agency principal, an agent
is able to -- well, consent can be withdrawn at a
certain time. And I think we have an issue here, I
think, if you -- and you also spoke of a ping-pong
match next week coming right back to you. I think if
you -- you are entering a valid order -- you are --
                     I -- I believe it to be a valid
         THE COURT:
order.
         MR. JOY: Right.
         THE COURT:
                     The Circuit may disagree.
the language the Circuit used in their stay order kind
of tells me that they very well may not disagree.
         MR. JOY: Correct. And in looking at all of
that, I still don't think the statute under 402.100
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necessarily gives, under agency theory, the permission for either Mr. Mason, or my client, Ms. Russell, to issue a valid marriage license. They could issue you a license. Now, is that valid? I think that's the million dollar question that needs to be answered at some point. I don't think that question's being asked of us here today, but I just wanted to bring that to the Court's attention. THE COURT: So you believe that if he issued the license without her authority, it would be an invalid license? MR. JOY: Absolutely. THE COURT: All right. Mr. Sharp -- usually the -- the only time that would come up perhaps would be if there was a divorce, we were never married, or some contention later. Mr. Sharp, what's your position on the validity of the license, if it's issued without her authority? Do you take a position on that? MR. SHARP: Well, I mean, we think that she cannot condition her authority on an unlawful act, and -- which is what she has -- what counsel seems to be alluding to the fact that if she is withholding or may withhold her permission to issue licenses based on illegal conduct as far as --

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Well, I didn't find it to be THE COURT: illegal. I found that it was in violation of the Court's order. MR. SHARP: Contemptuous conduct, correct. We don't think her authority extends that far, insofar as the office, apart from Kim Davis, exists to perform certain public functions. Kim Davis does not have to personally touch every marriage license. She employs people for the purpose of carrying out the duties of that office. To the extent Kim Davis has an erroneous instruction of her ability to block them from doing that, that, nonetheless, does not mean that they cannot perform those functions. THE COURT: Well, the form says the clerk or deputy clerk. It does bear her name. And we're not going to plow that ground again. I previously found that really the clerk is performing a ministerial task verifying that the person is otherwise legally eligible to marry, and I'm not going to rehash that. The prior Court's order speaks for itself. This individual has -- Mr. Mason has indicated that he will issue the licenses. Now, I don't think it's necessary at this

point, given your statement to me here under oath,

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that you would issue the licenses, for me to ask each
of the others if they're going to follow the order or
not. Because by doing that -- yes, sir?
         MR. HUGHES: I don't want to put Mr. Mason in
the position, and he had a valid concern, and I
certainly don't want to put the others in that
position because there's a -- obviously, a least
restrictive way to go ahead involving these licenses.
         His concern is, is that you heard her use the
term "front-line, five people," and that basically
means he's going to be the only one -- not that
there's that many people that will be applying, but
with the publicity of this case, I wouldn't be
surprised if they come from all over. But the point
is, is that he's going to be --
         THE COURT: And unfortunately, I can't
control that.
         MR. HUGHES: I know you can't.
                     This case has been tried -- not
         THE COURT:
tried -- both sides have been equally -- "guilty" has
a bad context -- participance, equal participance in
making this a very public -- and the issues are
weighty issues; no question, but making it far more
public than it perhaps would otherwise be.
         And I don't want to put anybody in a bad
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situation; I don't. It's not the way the Court
2
  operates.
            MR. HUGHES: He recognizes that. He just --
3
4
   it's probable that there may be some others that also
5
   agree to comply.
 6
            But the point is, is that if we would stop it
   at this point, as understandable as that is, he faces
7
   singular ostracism from the public.
8
            THE COURT:
                        I appreciate that, and you're
9
           That's a good point. That's a good point.
10
   Because what -- the Court's whole goal here -- it's
11
   not the Court's goal ever to hold anyone in contempt
   for violating an order. I mentioned earlier, I'll
1.3
   mention it again. I mean, there's very little law
14
  because most individuals comply.
15
            If someone is willing to comply, and most of
16
   the -- well, it seems as if there have been situations
17
   where other clerks who may have religious objections
18
   have allowed other deputies to issue licenses for him
19
   or her to enable the Supreme Court's Obergefell's
20
21
   decision to be implemented, and this individual's
   willing to do that.
22
                  I will proceed.
23
            Okay.
                                     Thank you.
                                                 You
24
   all -- you can step back, Mr. Mason.
25
            Mr. Davis --
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MR. CAMPBELL: Judge, why don't we ask how
1
  many other compliers we've got before we get to
2
  Mr. Davis. If we have two or three other clerks that
  also will comply, I might want to be last in line.
            THE COURT: Well, I can recognize that. I
5
  mean, I -- we all love our parents. I mean, that's
6
  not a -- well, we -- most of us love our parents.
  Perhaps there may be reasons why we may not in an
8
  individual case or two.
9
            Any other defense attorneys after speaking
10
   with their respective clients that I appointed
11
   indicate that they would be willing to issue the
  licenses?
1.3
            Mr. Markelonis?
14
            MR. MARKELONIS: Judge, if we can approach
15
   the podium.
16
            THE COURT: Sure. Come around. And this is
17
   Ms. Thompson?
18
            MS. THOMPSON:
19
                          Yes.
            MR. MARKELONIS: Yes, sir.
20
21
            THE COURT: All right. Ms. Thompson, if you
   would swear her, please, under oath. Thank you.
22
                [MELISSA THOMPSON, having been first
23
2.4
      placed under oath, was examined and responded
      as follows:]
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1.3

THE COURT: And I understand that this may be difficult for all of you. And I -- and I, on behalf of the Court, had never intended on any of these proceedings to put any of you in harm's way or make you uncomfortable with anything. Because frankly, we were just talking about this during the break. I mean, the most difficult cases are the hardest ones, and they're hard for a variety of reasons. Legally perhaps, emotionally perhaps, factually -- and I've not been to Morehead recently. I understand what's occurring almost on a daily basis there. I know folks that go to Morehead State. We have jurors from Rowan County who come up here and serve.

So I want you all to know that the Court has tried to shepherd this case through the court, at least here in the district court level, in a way that enables the issues to be raised and adjudicated as promptly as possible, while making sure that each of your individual circumstances are taken care of.

Now, you really haven't -- you've all been behind the -- we talk about "behind the curtain." I mean, you've been behind the desk for a long -- for the whole time. And unfortunately, based upon the actions here, I've had to summons you each to court.

So I just felt -- I saw you getting ready to

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tear up and I wanted you -- I wanted to address that
  to you because I don't like to make anybody cry; I
2
         I don't think the Court would ever want to do
  that. I don't think these lawyers would ever want to
   do that. They have issues they want to raise, both
5
   sides do.
6
7
            I've said it once, I'll say it a thousand
          We -- we can have all our individual
8
  disagreements as citizens of the United States. But
9
  here in the United States, we resolve those in a way
   that are -- we peacefully have disobedience, we
11
  peacefully protest, we expect at the end of the day
   for the Court's orders to be complied with, and that's
1.3
  how things work here in America.
14
15
            So, Ms. -- did you place her under oath? I'm
16
   sorry.
            DEPUTY CLERK:
                           Yes, I did.
17
18
            THE COURT:
                        Okay.
                            Judge, if I could?
19
            MR. MARKELONIS:
20
            THE COURT:
                        Yes.
21
            MR. MARKELONIS: I spoke at some length, like
   the other lawyers, with Ms. Thompson. I would say
22
23
   that she's uniquely situated here.
            Before going to work at the county clerk's
25
  office, she worked for Judge Mains, the circuit judge
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2.4

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there, for some time as his secretary.
2
                        Is he still the circuit judge
            THE COURT:
  there?
3
 4
            MR. MARKELONIS: No. He's been retired for a
   while.
5
6
            THE COURT: That's what I thought. That's
7
   what I thought.
            MR. MARKELONIS: But I think she's probably
8
  maybe uniquely qualified among the deputies to
9
  appreciate judges who want their orders complied with.
10
            THE COURT: Well, I think any judge would
11
   expect, not want, expect the orders to be complied
  with.
13
            MR. MARKELONIS: And she understands that,
14
          She's wrestled with this. But she indicated
15
   Judge.
   to me that she's willing to comply with the Court's
16
17
   order.
           She has her own personal feelings about the
   issue, like all the other persons in here. But she's
18
   indicated to me that she'll comply with the Court's
19
   order and do what she has to do.
20
21
            THE COURT: All right. So, Ms. Thompson, how
   long have you been employed with the clerk's office?
22
23
            MS. THOMPSON: I was there almost 13 years,
2.4
   and then I left and I came back, so probably about 15,
25
   16 years.
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1
            THE COURT: Okay. So you left there to go
  work for the circuit judge?
2
            MS. THOMPSON: I worked for Judge Mains about
3
4
   a year-and-a-half.
            THE COURT: Okay. And then you came back?
5
   So I worked for Ms. Davis's mother as well?
6
7
            MS. THOMPSON: I worked for Ms. Bailey, yes.
            THE COURT: It was Ms. Bailey?
8
            MS. THOMPSON: Uh-huh, Jean Bailey.
9
            THE COURT: Okay. Okay. Are you willing to
10
   comply with this Court's order requiring that marriage
11
   licenses be issued to the plaintiffs in this case or
   any other individuals who are legally eligible to
1.3
  marry in Kentucky?
14
15
            MS. THOMPSON: Yes, Your Honor. I don't
   really want to, but I will comply with the law. I'm a
   preacher's daughter, and this is the hardest thing
17
   I've ever done in my life --
18
            THE COURT: Well, we all have things we
19
   don't --
20
21
            MS. THOMPSON: -- but I will comply.
22
            THE COURT: -- we don't want to do. Now,
23
   I've been very careful in this case --
2.4
            MS. THOMPSON:
                           I don't hate anyone at all.
            THE COURT: Well, I don't believe Ms. Davis
25
```

```
does.
            MS. THOMPSON: None of us hate --
2
                        The rhetoric that goes on outside
3
            THE COURT:
4
  the courtroom --
            MS. THOMPSON: None of us hate anybody. It's
5
   just hard.
6
7
            THE COURT: No one does. I appreciate that;
   I really do.
8
            It's always folks that aren't involved that
9
   speak the loudest because they want -- they don't --
   they sometimes don't have all the information and they
11
   -- someone sends an email and says, "Look what's going
   on in Kentucky. We need to be heard and --"
1.3
            I mentioned the 2,000 calls. I don't blame
14
15
   folks for calling. I think every judge in America
   isn't going to be swayed by calls like that.
16
            That's -- the public interest is important,
17
   clearly. I appreciate that. And I appreciate your
18
   hesitation. I think in a very real way, you're likely
   like many of the individuals in this courtroom. Both
20
21
   sides -- there's strong views on both sides, no
   question.
22
23
            It's not my job to tell five Supreme Court
2.4
   Justices that they're wrong. The Supreme Court is
25
   able to revisit their decisions, but it's the Supreme
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Court that does that.
            So this issue that's been raised -- I mean,
2
  he doesn't have a key, Mr. Mason. I mean, I don't
3
  know -- Mr. Watkins, you're the county attorney. Are
  you in the building --
 6
            MR. WATKINS: Yes, sir.
7
            THE COURT: -- where the county -- the
  clerks' office is?
8
            MR. WATKINS: Yes, sir. Yes, sir. Usually
9
  when they go to the clerk's office and it doesn't work
   out, they end up in my office, Your Honor.
11
            THE COURT: Okay. Well, will you -- and I
12
  don't know who -- is there a chief deputy? I know
13
   everybody -- sometimes you have a -- someone who's a
14
15
   chief --
            MR. WATKINS: There is. Roberta Earley.
16
17
            MS. EARLEY: Roberta Earley.
            THE COURT: You're the chief deputy?
18
19
            MS. EARLEY: I am.
            THE COURT: Okay. I think, and if necessary,
20
   I'll eventually get to you. But I appreciate your
   candor, ma'am; I do. Thank you.
22
            If you'd step back. And now, Mr. Fox?
23
24
            MS. PLANK: Ms. Plank.
25
            THE COURT: Ms. Plank, come around, ma'am.
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1
            All right. If you would be sworn. Thank
2
   you.
                [KRISTIE PLANK, having been first
3
4
      placed under oath, was examined and responded
      as follows:1
5
6
            THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Plank, the Court has
7
  asked Ms. Thompson and Mr. Mason about the prior
  order. You're aware of the Court's prior order
8
   requiring that Ms. Davis no longer enforce her "no
9
  marriage license" policy?
            MS. PLANK: Yes, Your Honor.
11
12
            THE COURT: Okay. Have you -- and you've
   spoken with Mr. Fox about the potential consequences
1.3
   of not complying with that?
14
15
            MS. PLANK:
                        Yes.
            THE COURT: All right. Mr. Fox?
16
            MR. FOX: Yes, Your Honor. We did speak at
17
   quite length. And Ms. Plank presents a situation that
18
   I predicted to Mr. Campbell this morning when we
   talked about this case that would be present, which is
20
2.1
   that --
            THE COURT: Be what?
22
23
            MR. FOX: That --
2.4
            THE COURT: If you'd try to -- be -- we have
25
  the air on, so ...
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1 MR. FOX: I'm sorry. THE COURT: Go ahead, sir. 2 MR. FOX: Ms. Plank's situation's one that I 3 4 predicted, Your Honor. She is a mother of an 11-year-old child. She and her husband work hard to 5 keep up and make ends meet. 6 She's in a situation where she has personal 7 convictions, just like, as you've indicated, most 8 people in this courtroom, but she also has financial obligations. She has a duty to her child, to care for 10 her child. And she has struggled and is struggling 11 with the idea of balancing convictions with obligations, family and otherwise. 13 THE COURT: I think that's something 14 15 everyone's doing. MR. FOX: So our discussion primarily for the 16 half-hour that we met was about those convictions and 17 18 the balancing, and ultimately a choice of lesser of evils. And I think but for some of the these other obligations and responsibilities that she has, her 20 response to you today would be different. But these 22 are real world issues. And there are two things that she wanted me to talk about. 23 One, she wanted it to be clear that she had 2.4 personal opinions and beliefs that are contrary to

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2.4

what is expected of her in her job. But she respects the Court, and she recognizes that she's under an obligation under Rule 65 that you discussed, that the orders that apply to Ms. Davis also would apply to her as an employee of Ms. Davis, and I believe she will tell you that she will comply with your order.

She was quite articulate in explaining to me and us discussing this issue of whether she has the authority to do that. And while I was back there -- and fortunately, recent court orders allow us to bring these devices into the courthouse -- and 402.080, KRS 402.080 says that, "No marriage shall be solemnized without a license therefor. The license shall be issued by the clerk of the county."

She believes, and I don't know that she's wrong, that the authority is with the clerk. And if the clerk hasn't given her authority, then she probably doesn't have authority.

However, our discussion wasn't about whether she has authority to issue a license. Our discussion was about whether she was obligated to follow your order to do so. And she recognizes that she does have that -- or that she is under your authority to issue a license.

THE COURT: She appreciates the authority of

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the Court?
            MR. FOX: That's right. That's right. And
2
  whether -- as Mr. Joy and I've discussed -- whether
3
  that license, when issued by her or Mr. Mason, or
  anyone else, which is done without being given
   authority by Ms. Davis, whether that's valid or not,
   that's, I guess, going to be up to the plaintiffs to
   find out.
8
            But her final concern is this, and this
9
  was -- this is almost an emphatic concern. Her duties
   within the clerk's office are primarily to deal with
11
   automobile dealers. There are about 30 of them in
   Rowan County. This is a large --
13
            THE COURT: So she does -- she does like
14
15
   licensing of autos?
            MR. FOX: Licensing, the title transfers, and
16
   all the things that go along with that.
17
18
            THE COURT: And I know that line is always
   the longest when you go to the clerk's office.
            MR. FOX: That line's the longest. And
20
   that's her primary duty.
            She has been directed as an administrative
22
   issue within the office, when the dealers come in,
23
  take care of the dealers. And she's been concerned,
2.4
   and asked me several times in different ways, "That
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that's my job, is to deal with the motor vehicle
licensing. If there's no else that can issue other
types of licenses or do other things, then yes, I'm a
deputy clerk and I'll do what I'm told. But I'm also
told to take care of the dealers and those things
first because that's my primary responsibility."
         THE COURT:
                     Right. And you were told that,
ma'am, by Ms. Davis to take care of those folks,
right?
         MS. PLANK:
                     Yes, sir.
         THE COURT:
                     Okay. Okay.
         MR. FOX: So I've tried to allay her concerns
that if it occurs that, for example, Mr. Mason's
unavailable or if he's out sick, and she's the person
that's there who can issue a license, a marriage
license, she should do her job as she normally does
and take care of the dealers, and then take care of
marriage licenses, because that's what she's done for
the entire time that she's worked in the clerk's
office.
         MS. PLANK:
                    Well, in the last year.
changed that last year.
         MR. FOX: So that's -- that's been a concern.
She doesn't want to be accused of being in contempt
when she's following administrative practices in the
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office.
            THE COURT: Understood. Understood. All
2
3
  right.
 4
            Ma'am, I appreciate your attorney's comments
  about his discussions with you and your concerns.
5
  the concerns he just raised, do you share those,
6
  ma'am?
7
            MR. CHRISTMAN:
                            Your Honor, I'm sorry to
8
   object, but I'm not sure she's been sworn in.
9
            DEPUTY CLERK:
                           Yes, she was.
10
            THE COURT: Oh, I hadn't -- I swore her
11
12
   earlier.
            MR. CHRISTMAN: Okay. Sorry, Your Honor.
1.3
                        Thank you. I appreciate the
            THE COURT:
14
15
   heads-up. I did do that; did I not, Madam Clerk?
            DEPUTY CLERK: Yes, you did.
16
                        Okay. Thank you. So setting
17
            THE COURT:
   aside for the moment the discussion of whether or not,
18
   without the authority of the clerk, you have the
   ability to issue those marriage licenses, I mean,
20
   would you or are you willing to comply with the
   Court's order requiring you to issue marriage licenses
22
23
   to the plaintiffs in this case or any other
2.4
   individuals who are legally eligible to marry in
25
   Kentucky?
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MS. PLANK:
                        Yes.
1
                        What was that?
2
            THE COURT:
            MS. PLANK:
                        Yes.
3
4
            THE COURT:
                        Yes? Okay. All right.
                                                  Thank
5
   you.
         All right.
6
            MR. HUGHES: Judge, if I may --
7
            THE COURT: Yes, sir.
            MR. HUGHES: -- just briefly. I know you
8
  have others, but on behalf of Mr. Mason, some of the
9
   things we discussed was -- and I want to make it clear
   from the decision that he's made as well.
11
12
            One, if you consider that -- that Ms. Davis
   is incapacitated at this point, and I think
1.3
   incarceration probably qualifies for that, and not a
14
  person that dies, leaves office, resigns, or just
15
   incapacitated, there has to be some method to transfer
16
   the authority or the power to other people to keep
17
   operating the office.
18
            THE COURT: Well, you know what? It's --
19
   it's an interesting point you raise, and it wasn't my
20
2.1
          I think it was Judge Van Tatenhove's case.
   former judge/executive in Knott County. I'm not going
22
23
   to ask either of you to identify where Knott County
2.4
  was, but some of the other Kentucky lawyers may
25
   remember -- I think his name was Thompson.
```

MR. WATKINS: Randy. 1 2 THE COURT: Is that correct? MR. WATKINS: Randy Thompson. 3 4 THE COURT: Randy Thompson, yes. He was the county judge after being convicted of, I think it was 5 a vote-buying case. It's been a few years ago, and it 6 7 wasn't my case, so again, I don't follow it completely, but he actually ran the county from jail, 8 at least allegedly, for a while. 9 MR. FOX: That's correct. 10 THE COURT: So -- if there is, and perhaps 11 there might be some mechanism that would allow for I don't know. 1.3 that. Well, I say that, Judge, and MR. HUGHES: 14 just coincidentally, the clerk in Boyd County is 15 retiring. In fact, she retired Monday. She resigned 16 her office. 17 The office is open and it can't be filled 18 until a person that's going to be appointed has to 20 take the test during the vacancy. You can't take it just in advance, believe it or not. You have to take it during -- so the office then does not have a clerk. 22 23 So what they've done is they simply bring a 2.4 clerk from another county over. I mean, that's the 25 position that they've always done when clerks resign

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or they're incapacitated. I don't know that applies
2
  to this case, but --
            THE COURT: Well, and I don't know if they
3
4
  brought another clerk over from another county to do
   that here, I mean, whose authority would that be
   issued under?
6
            MR. HUGHES: I mean, I don't know the answer.
7
   I just know that -- I just to want to make the point
8
   that Mr. Mason is in -- is in the same -- the same
9
   glass globe that everybody is that's going to be
   looking at it. He wants to comply with your orders.
11
12
            Now, how they work this out in Rowan County
   or Franklin County, or wherever it has to go, will be
1.3
   their -- their issue. But -- but his consensus is
14
   that he's going to comply with your orders, unless
15
   someone stops him otherwise from doing it.
16
            The second thing is, is it's long standing
17
   law in divorce cases, that that's what they're worried
18
   about, is that even if there's a mistake made
19
   somewhere along the line, if the parties thought they
20
   were getting married, they're considered married.
            THE COURT: Like common law -- common law
22
23
  marriage.
2.4
            MR. HUGHES: And I don't know about the other
25
  issues that may arise, but -- but at least for that
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purpose they are.
            THE COURT: Well, most people when they get
2
  married don't expect to get divorced.
3
 4
            MR. CHRISTMAN: Your Honor, I'd -- I'd just
   like to make two remarks in response to the comments.
5
            THE COURT:
                        Sure, just two. Go ahead.
 6
7
            MR. CHRISTMAN:
                            Thank you, Your Honor.
   first would be this gentleman has referred to another
8
9
   county --
            THE COURT:
                        Mr. Hughes?
10
            MR. CHRISTMAN:
                            Mr. Hughes. I'm sorry.
11
                                                      Ι
   didn't remember your name --
            THE COURT:
                        Thank you, sir. I just wanted to
1.3
  make sure you were ref --
14
            MR. CHRISTMAN: -- immediately. But the --
15
   he just suggested that other county clerks can come in
   and issue licenses.
17
            THE COURT: I don't know if that's true or
18
         That would be a least alternative.
19
            MR. HUGHES: I'm just saying that they do it
20
   real commonly when they transfer authority.
22
            THE COURT: When authority's transferred?
            MR. HUGHES: Yes. And I don't know -- you
23
24
  know, there's not that many clerks that probably this
25
   issue comes up on a regular basis or to challenge.
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just know that it has been policy in the past, and I've been at this 40 years now, that whenever clerks leave their offices, for whatever, there is a gap there and that is -- that's commonly how it's taken care of so that the public offices continue. THE COURT: All right. MR. CHRISTMAN: And I would just raise that that's exactly one of the least restrictive alternatives that we've proposed. That if somebody wanted to get a license in Rowan County issued by the county clerk, they could get it from another county authorizing that. THE COURT: Recognizing -- sure. MR. CHRISTMAN: And there's been testimony being raised previously that 402.240 is a statute discussing absence of a county clerk. And there's been discussions now, you know, with Ms. Davis incapacitated and incarcerated, Kentucky marriage law provides, as we argued before, that her conscience provides the absence. And certainly in the Kentucky THE COURT: Well, I found previously that the -- hold on -- I found previously that the conscience doesn't provide the absence for purposes of absence in the prior ruling.

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MR. CHRISTMAN: But Kentucky marriage law provides the outlet for -- the answer for when the county clerk is absent and unable to authorize a license isn't to change Kentucky marriage law and make the deputy county clerk the authorizing agent. What that does is turn Judge Blevins into the authority under that section when the clerk is absent to --THE COURT: But it would still be issued under her authorization. MR. CHRISTMAN: No. THE COURT: The form would be under her name, though. MR. CHRISTMAN: No. The statute provides that when the clerk is absent, that the marriage licenses be issued by the county judge/executive on a memorandum. As Judge Blevins testified, he'd -- he had never done it before, but under the facts and circumstances here, Kim Davis is currently now rendered absent. The authority -- there is no authority for the deputy clerks. Kentucky marriage law then says that authority vests into the county judge/executive to issue a marriage memorandum. All right. Mr. Watkins? THE COURT:

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MR. WATKINS: Judge, I think he just said an
inaccurate statement. It -- it allows him. It says
"may issue a license." There's no requirement there
for a judge/executive to ever issue a license.
         THE COURT: All right. Well, ultimately
here, if I were to follow your argument,
Mr. Christman, to its logical conclusion by -- it
would enable her to be found in contempt, but then get
what she wants, doesn't it strike you as a little
disingenuous?
         MR. CHRISTMAN: In terms of get what she
wants?
         THE COURT: Well, she wants the -- you argued
initially that she wants the judge/executive to do it
as a least restrictive alternative. He can issue it.
         I previously found that her religious
objection doesn't allow her to be absent. You're
saying now she's been locked up for violating my
order. "She's now absent, actually absent, Judge.
They can go to the county judge." That's what you
arqued before. It seems like I would be rewarding her
for her contemptuous behavior by allowing the judge to
do it. Clear those up for me.
         MR. CHRISTMAN: No. The Court -- the Court
would simply be -- the Court made its determination on
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what the word "absent" meant in the statute under the
facts and circumstances that were presented before the
Court then.
         THE COURT: Correct.
         MR. CHRISTMAN: The facts and circumstances
are different now, so the Court makes an
interpretation of what the word "absent" means.
Kim Davis currently absent from issuing marriage
licenses?
         THE COURT:
                    Okay. Okay. Then when is she
then purged of her contempt?
         MR. CHRISTMAN: Well, she's purged of her
contempt when, at this point, we're left to file
certain writs in order to have her released from the
custody that she is in, and the merits of her claims
are challenged and taken up on appeal, and she
prevails on the merits of her appeal, which have not
been addressed.
         THE COURT: No, the merits have not.
likelihood of success has been addressed.
         MR. CHRISTMAN: And that was likelihood of
success in her capacity -- in her official capacity to
which the appeal was taken, she has raised those
individual claims against the governor and for any
liability that she may have --
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1 THE COURT: Those are not on appeal right 2 now. 3 MR. CHRISTMAN: -- and they have not been 4 taken up, which is again, further, why our due process concerns as to the judgments and determinations that 5 are being taken here. She's now been sent into 6 confinement -- as Your Honor said, the purpose of 7 contempt is to coerce the contemnor into compliance. 8 THE COURT: Correct. 9 MR. CHRISTMAN: Now, in addition and well 10 beyond that, the Court is now deciding, after putting 11 Kim Davis in imprisonment for civil contempt of an order, the Court is now stepping in, short of the 1.3 merits being fully decided, and saying, "I'm going to 14 now order others without the authority, without the 15 merits of her appeal being taken up to do an act that 16 she cannot do." It is literally the analogous 17 situation. And physically -- we've now moved to the 18 point where if she's in contempt, as you've found, and now a marriage license that she says she gives no 20 authority to and is challenging on the merits of appeal, you force that license to go out on her 22 23 authority and on her name, you have forced the nurse 24 to --THE COURT: Forced the who? 25

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1
            MR. CHRISTMAN: -- perform the abortion. You
  have forced --
2
            THE COURT: Why do we always use that
3
4
   analogy? There's so many others to use.
            MR. CHRISTMAN: Because those are the
5
  analogies in which religious conscience claims have
6
  been raised in cases, Your Honor.
7
            THE COURT: Well, you've -- you've
8
   represented other parties other than religious cases,
9
  have you?
10
11
            MR. CHRISTMAN: I've -- I've represented
   other people who are religious, yes.
            THE COURT: Well, or non-religious. I mean,
1.3
   I think ...
14
15
            MR. CHRISTMAN: And I have plenty of years of
   representing non-religious people as well.
            THE COURT: Well, I know that. I know that.
17
   I would just prefer a different analogy; that's all.
18
   I understand your analogy, though.
19
            MR. CHRISTMAN: But the analogies are in the
20
   context of religious conscience to understand that she
   has -- you have found her in contempt --
22
                        I have.
23
            THE COURT:
            MR. CHRISTMAN: -- for a conscience claim
2.4
25
  that you didn't accept, that conscience claim, the
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1 merits of which are being challenged on appeal and have not been finally decided by a court of final 2 3 appeal. 4 And so you told her that she has an opportunity to purge her contempt if she -- if she 5 authorizes and issues the license. So her ability to 6 purge the contempt, her -- again, the purpose of contempt is to coerce the contemnor into compliance. 8 You've told her what that is. 9 If it -- if the hearing is now going to turn 10 into "let's find somebody to issue the license with 11 Kim Davis's name on it and her authority," then what the Court is now doing is turning Kim Davis's sanction 1.3 into a criminal punishment for what --14 15 THE COURT: No. I'm not doing that. MR. CHRISTMAN: -- she's done. You're taking 16 17 the extra step of forcing the conscientious objector to actually have the act that they object to performed 18 before the merits of that have been decided. 19 If the Judge -- if this Court decides that 20 it's going to find somebody else to issue a license, then --22 23 THE COURT: Well, I'm not finding anyone. 2.4 I'm just asking if they're willing to comply with the 25 order.

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1
            MR. CHRISTMAN: Then the authority for that
  marriage license is not Kim Davis. It's --
2
            THE COURT: Well, it very well may not be
3
 4
   her.
            MR. CHRISTMAN: -- it's this Court. And our
5
   position would be -- and --
6
            THE COURT: Well, it's not this Court; it's
7
  the Rowan County Clerk's office. But go ahead.
8
            MR. CHRISTMAN: No, because Rowan County
9
   Clerk's office authority is Kim -- is Kim Davis, and
   Kim Davis is not giving that authority.
11
12
            So if marriage licenses are issued, those
  marriage licenses -- if Judge Blevins is not willing
13
   to exercise the opportunity he now has to issue the
14
   marriage licenses that he said he would issue, then
15
   this Court becomes the authorizing and issuing agent.
16
   And for any of those marriage licenses, the
17
18
   authorization statement should come from this Court,
   and the authorization agent should be United States
   District Court Judge David Bunning --
20
21
            THE COURT:
                        All right. Thank you.
            MR. CHRISTMAN: -- not Kim Davis.
22
23
            THE COURT: You wanted to say something,
2.4
  Ms. Parsons?
25
            MS. PARSONS:
                               I -- I just agree with
                          No.
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Mr. Watkins's point. We don't believe that this is an
  absence. We believe it is a -- if a religious
2
  conscience objection does not qualify as an absence,
  we don't understand how incarceration caused by that
   objection and refusal to comply with your order
5
   constitutes an absence.
6
7
            THE COURT: All right.
            MS. PARSONS: We also believe that the deputy
8
   clerks' willingness to issue the licenses removes that
9
   absent issue entirely under KRS 402.240.
            THE COURT: All right. Mr. Vance, Mr. Sharp,
11
   do you all wish to be heard on this, this issue of
   authorization and --
13
            MR. VANCE: No, Your Honor.
14
15
            THE COURT:
                        No?
            MR. SHARP: No. Your Honor, we agree with
16
17
   the county.
18
            THE COURT: All right. Well, I take it,
  Mr. Davis, Ms. Russell, Ms. Earley, you've all spoken
   with your attorneys?
20
21
            MR. DAVIS: Yes.
22
            MS. RUSSELL: Yes.
23
            MS. EARLEY: Yes.
2.4
            THE COURT: Where are we? We're here and
25
  here and here. Okay.
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MS. EARLEY: Yes.
1
2
            THE COURT: Okay. Let me ask the attorneys
   who represent you.
3
 4
            Mr. Campbell, Mr. Joy and Mr. --
            MR. CLARK:
                        Clark.
5
 6
            THE COURT:
                        Yes, Mr. Clark. I'm sorry.
                                                      Ι
7
   was looking here and not who was standing.
            I take it after you speaking with your
8
   respective clients, the answers that were given by the
9
   other deputy clerks, is it safe to assume that they
   would be different with your clients?
11
12
            MR. JOY: Did you say they'd be different?
            THE COURT: Different answers.
1.3
            MR. JOY: Your Honor, I don't -- I don't
14
15
   think that would be accurate. I think they would be
   pretty similar, at least from my client.
            THE COURT: All right. Mr. Clark?
17
            MR. CLARK:
                        Your Honor, my client has been
18
   unable to give me her answer at this point.
            THE COURT: All right. Mr. Campbell?
20
21
            MR. CAMPBELL: Same as Mr. Clark's. We don't
   have an answer for the Court at this point.
22
23
            THE COURT: All right. Well, I think it's --
2.4
   for completeness sake, I think -- and I am -- in
25
   response to what Mr. Christman said, the Court is
```

```
trying to gain compliance with its order.
2
            I -- less than an hour-and-a-half ago, I made
  the difficult decision to incarcerate Ms. Davis for
3
  being in civil contempt of the Court's prior order.
   This Court recognizes that she has raised issues that
5
   are currently on appeal.
6
7
            I read Rule 65(d)(2)(B) to cover the deputies
  because they are employees of the clerk's office, and,
8
  therefore, they are bound by the same order that
9
  Ms. Davis is bound by.
            I'm not authorizing the issuance of the
11
  licenses on the authority of this Court. I'm trying
  to gain compliance with the Court's order.
1.3
            I think whenever any judge -- or whenever any
14
   judge issues an order, he or she expects the party who
15
   is subject to that order to comply or any agents or
16
17
   employees that are otherwise bound by that order these
   deputies under 65(d)(2)(B) to comply as well.
18
            We'll go ahead and -- Mr. Joy, and,
19
  Ms. Earley, if you'd come around. I'm sorry.
20
21
   Mr. Clark.
               I was -- come around.
22
                [ROBERTA EARLEY, having been first
23
      placed under oath, was examined and responded
2.4
      as follows:
25
            THE COURT: Okay. Now, Ms. Earley, I know
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your individual situation is a little bit different in
  that earlier you told me, or someone represented that
2
  you are -- you're the chief deputy, though?
3
 4
            MS. EARLEY: I am the chief deputy, yes.
            THE COURT: Okay. But you're not really a --
5
   is it true that you're not like one of the front-line
6
   folks?
7
            MS. EARLEY: I don't work on the front line.
8
   I work back in the legal department.
9
            THE COURT: Okay. The legal department?
10
            MS. EARLEY: Uh-huh (affirmatively).
11
            THE COURT: So do you work with --
12
            MS. EARLEY: Recording, and work -- assist
1.3
  the attorneys, yes.
14
15
            THE COURT: Okay. So when the attorneys come
   in and ask for help --
17
            MS. EARLEY: Right.
            THE COURT: -- they are pointed toward you?
18
19
            MS. EARLEY: Right.
20
            THE COURT: Now, how long have you been with
2.1
   the clerk's office?
            MS. EARLEY: I've been there 16 years.
22
            THE COURT: Sixteen (16) years. Okay.
23
24
   you worked for Ms. Bailey as well then?
25
            MS. EARLEY:
                         I did.
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THE COURT: Okay. Are you willing to comply
with the Court's order requiring the issuance of
marriage licenses to the plaintiffs in this case or
any other individuals who are legally eligible to
marry in Kentucky?
         MR. CLARK: Judge, if I could briefly respond
for her on that.
         THE COURT:
                     Yes.
         MR. CLARK: In discussions with her,
obviously, she hasn't issued marriage licenses in
years --
         THE COURT: Well, she'd been there 16 years,
so, right.
         MR. CLARK:
                     Yeah. Her concern at this point
is obviously -- it's kind of a short period of time.
I don't know that she expected this to be thrust upon
her in this circumstance like this today.
         THE COURT: And I -- again, I'm not going to
apologize for everyone here. I'm just -- the docket
is what it is and we're trying to get to a resolution.
         MR. CLARK: No. I understand that, Your
Honor, and she does as well. I guess what we would
request is -- or what she was asking for was maybe
some more time to think about it. I've explained to
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            MS. EARLEY: Get a game plan together,
2
  uh-huh.
                        Yeah. I've explained to her
3
            MR. CLARK:
4
  what, in effect, the consequences of the Court's order
  of not following that order, and she's well aware of
5
   that. And she's also well aware of the arguments
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   that, I think, Ms. Davis's counsel has made. And she
   does have some differing viewpoints.
8
                        When you say "differing," there's
            THE COURT:
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  lots of different viewpoints.
            MR. CLARK:
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                        Yes.
12
            THE COURT: Some of them have been made
   available here today. And there's also ones that
13
   remain in each of our hearts.
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            MR. CLARK: Correct, Your Honor. And I think
   that she's probably a little bit of all of those. But
   she was unable to tell me exactly whether she would
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   follow the order or not, Your Honor. I would just ask
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   for time for her to be able to make that decision.
            THE COURT: And when you say "time", are you
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   wanting me to recall her a little bit later or ...
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                        I was thinking maybe a day or
            MR. CLARK:
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  two, Your Honor.
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            THE COURT: Well, I'm certainly -- I am not
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  going to reconvene another one of these hearings
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tomorrow here in Ashland, or -- I guess Monday's Labor
  Day -- or Tuesday.
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            So you're wanting more time to consider that;
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  is that right?
            MS. EARLEY: Well, it seems like every step
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  we take, we've got questions, and -- like who's in
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   authority, you know, whose name goes on that. And
  that's -- things like that, I think, need to be worked
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   out, and definitely, I'm not an attorney.
9
            THE COURT: Well, we have lots of attorneys
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  here have been making their arguments here this
11
   afternoon and this morning.
            MS. EARLEY: And I guess one of the questions
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   was, is Kim still the one that's going to be telling
14
   us what to do? Do we go by her authority or ...
15
            THE COURT: Well, the authority -- the reason
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   for this hearing is because Ms. Davis was not
17
   complying with the order of the Court. There's a lot
18
   of discussion --
19
            MS. EARLEY: Uh-huh.
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21
            THE COURT: -- but at its very core, the
   hearing is about compliance with the Court's orders.
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            MS. EARLEY: I understand that.
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            THE COURT: And whether or not a marriage
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  license issued tomorrow by any one of the agents of
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Ms. Davis is a valid license under the Kentucky statute. These plaintiffs are going to have to decide whether or not they want to perhaps have a license issued, which may not be valid under Kentucky law, but they're willing to take that chance. Or perhaps they're not going to take that chance and hope that maybe in some future date the statute is amended or there's some activity by the elected officials to change it. That's not -- I'm trying to gain compliance with the order, and that's -- so you do -- have raised some interesting questions, as the other attorneys have as well. But what I'm getting at is, if I have individuals who've indicated they're willing to issue the licenses, and I order that to occur, it will be on the form that was used. That's -- if there's a move afoot to amend that, great. I think that would enable all parties to come away with something. Many times in litigation certain parties win and certain parties lose. Oftentimes, though, you have cases where everybody gets something.

I've struggled in this case to find middle

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ground on anything because both sides have been so
insistent on digging their heels in at every turn,
which is certainly the litigant's right to do. And
it's my job to try to keep the decorum even, try to
keep everybody on the same page.
         So I guess getting back to my initial
question, do you wish additional time to answer that
question, or are you willing to issue those licenses?
         MS. EARLEY:
                     Well, I'm not set up to issue
them, but I won't go against your order.
         THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Mr. Joy,
Ms. Russell.
         All right. Would you place Ms. Russell under
oath, please.
             [KIM RUSSELL, having been first placed
    under oath, was examined and responded as
    follows:1
         THE COURT: All right. Ms. Russell, you've
had a chance to talk to your lawyer now about the
consequences of not complying with the order, correct?
         MS. RUSSELL: Yes, sir.
         THE COURT: All right. Mr. Joy.
         MR. JOY: Your Honor, in speaking with her --
         THE COURT:
                     If you'd speak close to the
microphone.
             The air's on. Thank you.
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MR. JOY: Your Honor, in speaking with her, I think the fundamental issue that she had was that she was rehired by Ms. Davis in March of this year. She's only worked there for a few months at this point. On or about June 30th, after -- after the decision by the Supreme Court came out, Ms. Davis revoked her authority to issue any marriage licenses to the entire office. I think that's what led to this hearing. And as I previously stated, that's the same issue she has right now, is she does not believe she has authority to go forward and issue, from Ms. Davis, that is, no authority to issue a marriage license. But I believe her position will be that in regards to the Court's order, she will issue a marriage license, she will comply with that going forward. She is torn with that decision, but she does not want to go to jail, and that's the simple semantical --Well, that's an option the Court THE COURT: I mean, the Court could fine her in the alternative of jail. MR. JOY: Correct, Your Honor. But I believe

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the Court's action in regarding to send Ms. Davis
to -- to the marshal's custody for not complying with
that order has led her to believe that -- although a
contempt hearing has not been held in regards to her,
that if the Court does have a contempt hearing, that's
the way the Court could go.
         So based on that information, I believe she
is willing to issue a marriage license, if the Court
orders her to do so here today.
         THE COURT: So, ma'am, do you intend on
complying with the Court's order requiring you to
issue marriage licenses to the plaintiffs in this case
or any other individuals who are legally eligible to
marry in Kentucky?
         MS. RUSSELL: Although I don't believe in it,
yes, sir, I will.
         THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
                                             All
right.
       Mr. Campbell?
         MR. CAMPBELL: Your Honor?
         THE COURT: Yes, sir?
         MR. CAMPBELL: Since we have so many people
who are going to comply, I don't think there's any
needs to question Mr. Davis.
         THE COURT: Mr. Davis, you would answer "No"
if -- and I recognize your mother's in custody and
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   I recognize that --
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            MR. DAVIS:
                        I would, yes.
            THE COURT: Pardon?
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            MR. DAVIS: I said, I would.
            THE COURT: You would answer "No?"
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 6
            MR. DAVIS:
                        Yes.
7
            THE COURT: Okay. All right. I don't think
  it's necessary to place him under oath.
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            MR. CAMPBELL: Thank you, Your Honor.
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            THE COURT: All right. Thank you, unless one
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   of the parties think it's necessary.
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12
            Having heard from neither of the parties
  then.
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            Okay. Here's what we're going to do. Now,
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  there has been an issue raised about the validity of a
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  marriage license issued that does not have the
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   authorization of Ms. Davis under Rule -- I'm sorry --
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  KRS 402.
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            Whether or not a license issued by the Rowan
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   County Clerk's office is valid or not, I mean,
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  that's -- that's kind of something that Mr. Sharp and
   your clients, if they believe it to be valid -- I'm
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   not saying it is or it isn't. I haven't looked into
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   that point. I'm trying to get compliance with my
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   order.
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The impact of compliance with the order is left for you. I mean, if you think that's a legitimate issue, then you can advise your clients accordingly, but that's not really something that I think precludes the Court from gaining compliance with the Court's order. And, of course, the Sixth Circuit's decision denying the motion to stay, it isn't a marriage decision. I recognize that. I recognize that there's a motion to dismiss -- or a motion for preliminary injunction that you filed. I recognize there's a motion to dismiss filed that you filed. I recognize that there's going to be a motion to dismiss filed by the governor's office. There's a whole myriad of issues which are part of this case which have not yet been adjudicated. I recognize all of that. I also recognize that pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Obergefell, the Fourteenth Amendment recognizes the rights that these plaintiffs in this case have. So I've entered my order. I'm seeking compliance. I've had this hearing. And now I have multiple deputies. Now, I'm confident that if a deputy clerk

issues a marriage license to any of these plaintiffs

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or to any individuals who are eligible to marry, given the nature of this proceeding, that all of you are -- I mean, I think you can do that under the authority that you were compelled -- you didn't -- you didn't want to be held in contempt of the Court's order, because that's what we're here to discuss today.

I would doubt that there would be any employment ramifications for doing so because you're following the Court's order. And in fact, if there was, that would be an issue that would be a separate proceeding, that frankly, I don't know if that even -- we need to even discuss that. But I'm confident that that's not going to happen. I -- I have every belief that Ms. Davis is sincere and wouldn't do anything like that to begin with.

But I am going to find that the -- given the representations of Mr. Mason, Ms. Thompson, Ms. Plank, Ms. Earley and Ms. Russell, five of the six deputies that are here, that they would comply with the Court's order. That the five of you as agents of Ms. Davis shall comply with the Court's order, which in essence precludes you or enjoins you from enforcing the prior order -- or prior -- enforcing the prior "no marriage license" policy implemented by Ms. Davis, over your objection. Your objection's noted and overruled, as

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early as tomorrow. I mean, tomorrow's before a long holiday. That's going to be the order of the Court. If in fact that's done, I think that would have the potential impact of purging the contempt. It's not my job -- it's not my intention to keep Ms. Davis locked up just because I think it's the right thing to do. I think it's the right thing to do to follow the Court's orders, and she has been found to be in contempt. So -- and I understand, Mr. Davis, you may not agree with the Court's order, as your attorney stated and you stated to me under oath, but there's been enough discussion to fill this courtroom ten times over outside. I'm hoping that cooler heads prevail and that the -- these licenses, which I previously found the policy to be invalid. I'm not going to go into the reasons; I've already stated that in my prior opinion. So the plaintiffs are going to be able to obtain the licenses from Rowan County at the clerk's Whether or not they're valid or not's up to you all. If you want to wait until you absolutely are sure they're valid, that's up to you. That's not up I'm just trying to gain compliance with to the Court.

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the order. I hope there's no shenanigans of, "Well, I'm going to be off today. I'm going to be off today, and let's all get together and be off, " so the only person working is Mr. Davis so that they can't comply with the Court's order. The Court will vigilantly oversee its orders, understanding that the orders are subject to -- some orders are subject to appeal as a right. I've previously denied your -- your interlocutory order -- or your request for an interlocutory order under 1291. I'm not going to revisit that. So, Mr. Sharp, I just want to make sure as we leave today that my order's specific. And it will be -- I don't know if I'll be entering my minute order today or not. Given the lateness of the hour, I'm probably -- I don't know when it will actually be entered. Probably sometime tomorrow. But we have five deputy clerks who have indicated they're willing to issue the licenses. They have argued -- Ms. Davis has argued through counsel that they're not valid licenses because she hasn't authorized the licenses. You disagree with that. I'm not taking a position on that. I think they're agents

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of her.
            They can -- agency principals, they can issue
  the licenses.
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            MR. SHARP: We agree, Your Honor, and we
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  agreed with the county.
            Our primary concern, and we're -- we're happy
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  for the Court to -- you know, with the deputy clerks'
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  testimony here today to find that that purges the
  contempt. Our --
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            THE COURT: Well, I'm not going to purge the
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  contempt today --
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            MR. SHARP: Okay.
            THE COURT: -- because I can see what will
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  happen, is I purge the contempt, and she goes back and
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   you're not doing it no more, and then we're right back
  here tomorrow.
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            MR. SHARP:
                        That's correct, Judge.
16
                        And I'm simply not going to allow
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            THE COURT:
  that to occur --
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                        That's precisely our --
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            MR. SHARP:
            THE COURT: -- because it's the ping-pong
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  match that -- if we get to next Tuesday, or let's say
   a week from today. I mean, because what I don't want
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   to happen is I purge the contempt, and then somebody
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   from Zilpo -- raise your hand if you know where Zilpo
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        Yeah, a few of you. Really good muskie fishing
   is.
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in Cave Run Lake down there. A couple from Zilpo decides we're going to get married, heterosexual, same-sex, what have you, and I purge the contempt, and Ms. Davis says, "I'm -- I'm not going to allow that to occur." This is not going to go back and forth, in my I'm trying to gain compliance with the Court's order pending appeal. I mean, if the Supreme Court had said, "Judge Bunning, you need to stay your decision," it would have been stayed. We wouldn't have had this hearing. But the appellate courts said, "You don't need to stay it, Judge, " and I'm following that. MR. SHARP: And we agree, Your Honor. And that's our biggest concern, that, you know, once the purge is obtained, disruption to the workforce, adverse employment actions could follow. We've --THE COURT: Well, I don't think there'll be adverse employment. If there are, I mean, I think we've -- the record speaks for itself. I mean, that would not be prudent. MR. SHARP: And we understand. You know, what we would suggest to the Court is perhaps a do not interfere component to the contempt insofar as Ms. Davis's ability to purge herself of contempt. She is, based on her testimony, perhaps unlikely to

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necessarily agree to the issuance of marriage
  licenses.
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            THE COURT:
                        I don't think she will.
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            MR. SHARP:
                        But if perhaps she could agree to
  a do not interfere component, that would allow her
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   deputies to do their jobs and issue marriage licenses
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   to those who are entitled to receive them. Perhaps
  that may be a way for her to do so.
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            THE COURT: Rowan County counsel, any
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   thoughts on that?
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            MR. WATKINS: I'm fine with it, Judge.
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12
            THE COURT: Mr. Gannam?
            MR. GANNAM: Your Honor, now that the Court
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  has obtained the agreement, or at least indication
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   from at least five of the deputy clerks that they will
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   issue marriage licenses, at this point, the Court's --
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   the contemnor is Kim Davis in her official capacity.
  And without waiver of any of the prior positions we've
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   taken and arguments we've made, Kim Davis in her
   official capacity with that designation is the Office
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21
   of Rowan County. It's a designation for a government
   entity through its head.
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23
            And for that reason, having obtained now the
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  statements from five deputy clerks that they will
   issue marriage licenses, then as a matter of fact, the
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Court's incarceration of Kim Davis has accomplished
  the goal of enforcement of the order. And any
  additional confinement would serve the purpose of
  punishment and not coercive enforcement of the order,
  because you've -- you've already obtained that now
  from these other deputy clerks.
            THE COURT: Well, why don't -- why don't we
  do this. Why don't we have her brought back in and
   see if she -- if I purge the contempt, and she then --
  well, I've had several deputy clerks that have
   indicated that they're going to be issuing the
   licenses so that they're not in violation of my order.
            Bring her back in to see if she would then
  protest and not let them do that if she's purged of
  the contempt.
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            MR GANNAM: Your Honor, may I have a
   question? If she's going to be brought back in, that
   we have an opportunity to confer, at least briefly,
  before they bring her out?
            THE COURT: Why don't you do that. We'll be
   in recess until 3:30.
            [RECESS - 3:06 - 3:40 p.m.]
            [IN OPEN COURT]
            THE COURT: All right. We had given
  Mr. Christman and Mr. Gannam additional time that
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they've asked, approximately ten minutes. You all wanted to be heard without Ms. Davis 2 being brought into the courtroom; is that right? 3 4 MR. GANNAM: Yes, Your Honor. You offered to bring Ms. Davis back in at -- based on our request to 5 consider purgation of the contempt based on the 6 7 representations of the deputy clerks. THE COURT: Correct. 8 MR. GANNAM: At this point, we're prepared 9 to, rather than bring Ms. Davis in, simply communicate to the Court that she does not grant her authority for 11 any licenses to be issued under her authority or by her name. And she -- she also does not make any 1.3 representations as to whether she would allow any 14 employee of her office to issue those licenses, even 15 without her authorization. 16 THE COURT: So if I were to ask her if -- so 17 you're not seeking to have her -- the prior contempt 18 order purged based upon the answers that you anticipate she would give? 20 Just so I'm clear, Your 21 MR. GANNAM: Yeah. Honor, we -- we cannot represent to the Court that 22 23 Ms. Davis would -- would allow licenses to be per --THE COURT: So if I would allow her to be 2.4 released from custody, you're not able to make a 25

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representation that she would allow the issue -- the
licenses to be issued tomorrow?
         MR. GANNAM: That's correct, Your Honor.
         THE COURT: Okay. All right. Fair enough.
Fair enough.
         You can go ahead and take her back into
custody -- or she's still in custody, but she was
waiting outside the hallway.
               Well, of course, as I previously
         Okay.
mentioned, the Court will continue to have oversight
of this matter while the litigation continues.
         Having indicated previously that five of the
deputies have expressed a willingness to comply with
this Court's prior order enjoining Kim Davis in her
official capacity from enforcing the "no marriage
license" policy to these plaintiffs, or anyone else
legally eligible to marry under Kentucky law, the
Court would expect each of the deputies -- and I'm
going to mention this to you, Mr. Davis.
         I haven't -- at your request and through
Mr. Campbell, I haven't asked you to formally be
placed under oath and answer questions because I have
five others that have indicated a willingness to do
     I have oversight over this matter. Again, I -- I
rule on what's part of the record.
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What someone -- and frankly, I don't know why there's a need to -- just because you're allowed to take a camera into a clerk's office, why is that necessary? I have five individuals who've said they're going to issue the licenses.

I know when I -- again, I just -- I want to ensure that the orders of the Court are complied with, and that's the whole reason why we've been here for the better part of five hours, or a little bit less than five hours today.

I would hate for this to turn into, we went back, we were told by Mr. Davis that he's going to enforce his mother's order. There's no marriage policy -- "no marriage license" policy, and we're not -- "we're not allowing any licenses today," or we're posting a sign that says, "We're working on computers, or we're doing something else," that shows a level of disrespect for the Court's orders. And I would expect that the Court's orders as reflected by the five individuals have indicated that they will follow the Court's August 12th, 2015 order, that it be enforced, that it be complied with.

Two circuit courts, the immediate Circuit Court, Sixth Circuit and the Supreme Court have not stayed my order, so it will be -- I do expect

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compliance.
            All right. Counsel, we will be entering a
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  minute order. I would anticipate it not being entered
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  until tomorrow. I want to make sure that it's
  accurate. I likely will follow up with part of the
   Court's prior order on the contempt finding with a
   white order next week.
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            The -- anything else today that we need to
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  take up specifically? Mr. Hughes?
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            MR. HUGHES: Judge, only just some
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  housekeeping.
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            THE COURT: And you are on behalf of
  Mr. Mason?
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            MR. HUGHES: Yes.
14
            THE COURT: All right, sir.
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            MR. HUGHES: Yes, sir. But I've discussed it
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  with the other counsel too.
17
            At the conclusion of this, that our clients
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  be allowed to stay until the courtroom's cleared. And
   when the courthouse is cleared, then maybe have the
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  marshals escort them to their vehicles just because of
   the emotional issue outside.
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            THE COURT: I think that's appropriate.
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            DEPUTY MARSHALL:
                              Yes, sir.
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            THE COURT:
                        I can only -- I can only say
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this, and I probably said it in a half-dozen ways today. And I mentioned in my initial order staying my order denying the motion to stay. Now, emotions seem to be running high, and they are. And these are important social issues that have been addressed. The Court hopes and expects individuals to treat each other with respect. Sometimes the person who shouts loudest is the one who doesn't get hurt. And that applies not only in a situation like this, but it also applies in our daily life. Hopefully, the discourse which has occurred -- and I haven't been outside, but I can hear it -can be peaceful, and will continue to be so. And I am hopeful that everyone understands whatever side you're on in this case, that the Court's order complying -or compelling compliance with the Court's prior order was reasoned. And you can disagree with it. But know that the Court put a lot of time and effort into reviewing the law and what has occurred up to this point in this action. I hope that everyone will be civil. someone has indicated to the Court that they are willing to comply with an order of the Court, they need to save face because with someone who they're talking about, the Judge has ordered that we comply.

That's correct; I have ordered compliance, because the Circuits have -- the Circuit and the Supreme Court have upheld my denial of the order staying or not staying this action pending appeal.

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I hope that everyone is treated with respect in this action. We can have a -- this country has always had disagreements. But what makes our country different than other countries is we are able to respect the rule of law, allow important issues to be raised fairly and calmly, and then allow decisions to be made, and then respect those decisions and comply with those decisions, whether we agree with them or not, unless such -- unless some court says that they don't need to be complied with. And up to this point, there's no court that has done that here. So I hope the discourse isn't -- doesn't continue.

I would hope that individuals would under -they've stated under oath their intentions. I would
hope that they would follow up with that.

I would hate to have to be -- come back to Ashland tomorrow. I'm certainly not going to come on Saturday. There's some football games being played on Saturday that I think some of us probably want to attend.

Okay. Mr. Sharp, anything further, sir,

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today?
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            MR. SHARP: Not from the plaintiffs, Your
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  Honor.
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            THE COURT: Mr. Gannam, anything today?
  Mr. Christman?
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            MR. GANNAM: No, Your Honor.
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            THE COURT: Ms. Parsons?
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            MS. PARSONS: No, Judge.
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            THE COURT: Mr. Watkins?
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            MR. WATKINS: No, Your Honor.
            THE COURT: Mr. Vance?
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            MR. VANCE: No, Your Honor.
            THE COURT: All right. Very well. Court
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  will be in recess.
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15
            [END OF PROCEEDINGS - 3:50 p.m.]
                   CERTIFICATE
16
            I, Sandra L. Wilder, certify that the
17
18
   foregoing is a correct transcript from the record of
  proceedings in the above-entitled matter.
20
            /s/ Sandra L. Wilder
21
22
            SANDRA L. WILDER, RMR, CRR,
            COURT REPORTER
                                  Date: 09/05/2015
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